MDGs

The Search for Principles of

Disaster Management

by

David Etkin, Graduate Program Director, Disaster and Emergency Management, Atkinson Faculty of Liberal and Applied Studies, York University, etkin@yorku.ca  

and

Ian Davis, Visiting Professor in Disaster Management, Cranfield,

Coventry, Oxford Brookes and Kyoto Universities, i.davis@n-oxford.demon.co  

This is a working paper in draft form.  Comments and suggestions are welcomed by the authors.

1. Why are principles needed for disaster management?         

The Oxford dictionary defines a principle as a “fundamental truth as (a) basis of reasoning”.  Principles guide people’s decisions and actions, policies and procedures developed by organizations, and laws and doctrines of political entities”. The Collins English Language Dictionary further defines a principle as ‘A general rule that you try to obey in the way that you try to achieve something.  Principled actions or behaviour, based on clear guidance concerning the way to act.”   These definitions place emphasis on the implicit authority contained in a principle as a ’fundamental truth’ or ‘general rule’.   Their purpose concerns practical action,  thus principles exist to ‘guide actions’, ‘achieve something’, or define the ‘way to act’.

The statement “We hold these truths to be self evident…” (U.S. Constitution – Thomas Jefferson) is one of principles.  If there is not a clear understanding and statement of principles, then there cannot be a consistent, cohesive and embracing disaster management strategy, or effective communication between different organizations.  A further incentive to develop guiding principles to provide direction to decision making in both disaster management and disaster risk management[1] has come from external pressures being exerted by donor governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In return for their support to developing countries needing grants and loans following disasters, they are increasingly demanding improved accountability to beneficiaries of assistance and overall transparency of operations –especially in financial management. For these demands to be satisfied shared ethical principles are needed to support policies and practice. ADB (2005)

Within the field of emergency and disaster management there are a plethora of principles (CRHNet 2005) described in various books (e.g. Alexander, 2002) and organizational websites (e.g. Eight Principles of Disaster Management: http://www.onphilanthropy.com/bestpract/bp2002-08-16.html).  These principles purport to provide a guiding and enduring basis for how the practice of disaster management is pursued.  Yet, a perusal of the various sets of principles reveals little convergence.  Why is this so and what are the implications of this diversity?

The authors suggest that the divergence emerges because of three basic reasons. (1) The first relates to differences in fundamental values and organizational mandates.  For example, an NGO such as the Red Cross or CARE with a strong focus on disaster assistance at the community level will not share all of the same values or purposes as the World Bank, which tends to work at international and national levels, though disaster management is important to both.  Their cultures are quite different, one rooted in humanitarian assistance and the other in a highly politicized economic environment where development has traditionally been viewed through the perspective of neo-classical economics. Other differences may relate to discipline.  A meteorological agency may focus on technology and advance warning, while a development agency might focus on community sustainability.

(2) But also, divergence exists because different people or organizations address disaster management from different operational perspectives.  An academic might be philosophical, a government agency strategic and a relief-based operation tactical.  As such their principles, which should reflect their personal or organizational purpose, would look quite different though they might not be in conflict with each other.  For example, the first of the eight principles from the philanthropy website noted above is “Do no harm”, while the first principle from Auf der Heide (1989) is “Because of the limited resources available, disaster preparedness proposals need to take cost-effectiveness into consideration.”  These two principles bear little relationship to each other, though it is quite possible that proponents of both would not object to the assertion of the other.  (3) Finally, people or organizations may work in different parts of the disaster management spectrum (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery).  Each of these “pillars” has its own requirements that would result in varying concerns and strategies.

Beyond the more idealistic aspects of organizational mandates lies the often unstated tendency of organizations to ensure their own survival and growth, even at the expense of optimally assisting disaster victims.  Numerous examples of this self-interest can be detected.  For example, after the 2004 Asian Tsunami, national and international agencies poured into the affected countries and embarked on energetic funding campaigns, often in competition with other agencies even though it was rapidly became apparent to everyone in the relief system that there was a plethora of agencies present –well beyond local needs. It was also apparent that far more money had been collected than could possibly be managed given limited local capacities or available funding channels. In addition, there was a marked lack of cooperation between many of the hundreds of NGOs while working to assist the disaster victims. From this chaotic situation successive evaluations have highlighted the urgent need for some consensus to be reached from agreed-to guiding principles. This would enable agencies to ‘sing  from the same song sheet’ Without such cooperation one can expect more scenarios like the Sri Lanka NGO circus of uncoordinated actions of hundreds of international ands national NGO’s, where each pursues their own individual goals.  The risk is of this pattern being repeated in all future mega-disasters that attract the attention of vast numbers of agencies. Competition for projects by agencies also applied to competition to secure media attention. Clinton, (2006); Scheper (2006); Telford and Cosgrave (2007) 

Further examples relate to the political turf wars during and after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in the US that hindered effective response, Few, if any, organizations are monolithic enterprises – competing agendas and internal priorities inevitably exist even in disaster situations.[2]  

These issues of agency self interest becoming dominant concerns highlight the continual need for guiding principles that asserts the priority or primary mission of humanitarian agencies to be based exclusively on the ‘needs of the affected community’ rather than any other internal consideration. This was the precise motivation of the ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ Initiative. (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003) and the Red Cross when they first promoted the ‘International Code of Conduct’ in 1995.  By February 2007 an astonishing total of 404 national and international agencies have signed the code, meaning that they will seek to abide by its conditions or principles.  Two of the ‘codes’ give a flavour of the overall focus:

“Code of Conduct No. 1.

The Humanitarian imperative comes first.
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries….”

“Code of Conduct No. 2.

Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognize the crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.”

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS) (1995) ‘Code of Conduct’ IFRCS: Geneva

However, given high levels of agency staff turnover in International NGO’s, it is possible that initiatives such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship or the Code of Conduct may be totally unknown to new staff. In 2007 Ian Davis, then a consultant to one of the largest Global NGO’s (who are developing an International Strategy to guide their global humanitarian programmes),  in varied discussions within a document on ethical concerns noted that there was a total absence of any reference to the Code of Conduct despite the fact that this agency was one of the early signatories, agreeing to abide by the requirements of the code. Subsequent enquiries indicated that this was because key staff were totally unaware of the existence of the code and their own agencies agreement to abide by its contents.      

Drabek (2005) presents another reason why the field of disaster management does not have a well defined set of principles, and that is because there is no general theory that underlies it.  He argues that there are aspects of theories such as those coming from social constructionism, sustainable development and vulnerability theory that are and can be used as a foundation of an emergency management theory, but that it is still very much in a stage of development.  Along a similar vein, Alexander (1999) notes that “Models and interpretations of disaster abound, but the phenomenon is so multi-faceted that a general theory of universal explanatory power is unlikely ever to be formulated”.

The authors propose that the field of disaster/disaster risk management would benefit greatly from a dialogue on the topic of principles for the purpose of creating a greater degree of convergence. There would appear to be three reasons why a body of agreed principles are needed:

First, they allow organizations to create more coherent sets of policies of procedures.

These would assist institutions with different values and mandates to better understand and talk to each other. But beyond such discourse, if clearly defined principles are accepted and agreed upon between different organizations then it is possible for genuine cooperation and coordination to occur on the basis of consensus. 

Second, principles can provide an agreed upon and ethical base for action.

It is essential to emphasise the ethical dimension in all aspects of disaster risk management since the lives of people and the viability of communities are at stake. Principles can assist in enabling decision makers to distinguish between relative ethical issues and universal ethical issues (see below for a discussion on the distinction). Ethical principles form the bedrock or platform to assist decision makers as they seek, (or are reluctantly pushed) into becoming more accountable to beneficiaries of their support, as well as becoming transparent in handling their operations and managing their finances.

Third, principles are needed to guide the various elements in disaster planning and implementation

They can assist in the development of policy, strategy, planning, tactics and actions on the ground as well as post disaster learning and adapting. It is essential to undertake disaster planning in all countries, and without guiding principles disaster/disaster risk management can be little more than a directionless formality. There are an abundance of principles to guide disaster managers and each of these ‘relative, or locally applicable principles’ can be tailored to suit an organisation and its role. It is important to recognise that while some principles may be consciously followed, others may be subconsciously recognised and applied. As well, some principles are explicit while others implicitly underpin operations.

An important part of the essence of any useful principle is in its simplicity, but disasters are always complex events that relate to varied hazards affecting multiple stakeholders, many levels of decision making and diverse sectors managed by a host of line ministries and departments.  Thus principles inevitably simplify (or over-simplify) subtle nuances and varied situations or demands. Nevertheless, despite this inherent complexity, it remains essential in guiding officials who need to act in a decisive and positive manner, to ‘boil down’ complex variables into simple, direct and easily comprehensible principles to assist the process.   

2. The ethical basis for principles        

Disaster management fundamentally deals with a response to human misery and losses of people’s livelihoods and assets, while disaster risk management is concerned with mitigating or preventing such losses; both processes tend to be rather anthropocentric.  People and societies engage in such humanitarian actions because they believe it is the ‘right thing to do’, and therefore this field is closely tied to ethics and morality.  Ethics is not about what is; rather, it is about what should be.  Ethical theories use principles tied to the norms of society in order to assess and justify actions and behaviors.  In this sense they are prescriptive and normative (describing what ought to be) as opposed to descriptive, which describes what is (though one hopes the two are closely linked!).

The basis for a set of disaster management principles could lie within the context of a social contract between government and its citizens, or upon moral theory (Zack, 2006). A social contract is based upon the idea that the purpose of government is to make life better for its citizens, and for that purpose they consent to be governed. The primary questions that need to be addressed from this perspective, according to Zack, are “What do governments owe citizens in situations in which government is temporarily dysfunctional?”, and “What responsibilities does it have in terms of preparing for disasters?”  Varying answers are possible, depending upon such factors as whether property is publicly or privately owned, what degree of risk citizens should accept for living and developing in hazardous areas, and the degree to which a government accepts benevolence as an operating principle.  A social contract would be based upon a theory of social justice (see for example, “A Theory of Justice” by John Rawles), which would be based upon either distributive justice or retributive justice.  The former is based upon a fair distribution of goods, rewards or benefits.  This is particularly important to the issue of disaster compensation and recovery.  The latter is based upon punishing wrong doings and emphasizes fair process, fair trials and proportional sentencing. This approach has a very long history in society[3]; an example would be suing a contractor who built a house improperly with the result that it was damaged in a disaster.

There are two main types of moral theories.  The first, called ethical relativism, states that morality varies between people and societies according to their cultural norms.  The second, called universalist or objectivist moral theories states that there are objective, fundamental principles that are invariant throughout time and space. Both types of theories have both strengths and weaknesses.  For example, cultural relativism suggests (taken to an extreme) that one should accept the murderous excesses of ethnic cleansing, simply because another cultural group accepts it as its cultural norm. Most people, and certainly the authors, find this repugnant.  Alternately, disregarding values of other cultures, even paternalistically, can lead to unintended and negative consequences (e.g. Jigyasu, 2005).

An example of a ‘relative’ ethical principle in disaster management could be as follows:

‘Before decisions and actions are taken that will either increase or decrease the risks facing a given community, responsible government officials need to actively consult people who are ‘at-risk’, or their representatives and be prepared to take account of such local opinion.’

Within western democracies, it is likely that there would be general agreement on the above principle, with the possible exception of people holding political views from the extreme right. Furthermore, most people would probably assume that this principle is universally applicable rather than being merely relative. However, we have placed this principle in the relative category since there are many societies, such as China (or possibly Cuba) where the ‘right’ to being listened to or consulted on matters of public policy is not part of the current political ideology or operational process.

A further example concerns the evacuation of communities when faced with an impending threat or actual hazard impact.  For example, in many western democratic cultures disaster evacuation is voluntary and consequently often ineffective, in contrast to other more controlled societies such as Cuba, where evacuation planning is not optional and therefore highly effective. 

A more common example of the clash of differing principles relates to the collision between progressive development thinking and entrenched traditional attitudes.  One of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) concerns the aim of securing gender equality by the year 2015. Doubtless this is a noble intention, but what possible chance does such an aspiration have of being realized, given deeply held male dominated cultural and religious norms present within some cultures?owever

This issue inevitably provokes a social controversy, since the entire process of developing and applying principles grows out of values and attitudes, which are inevitably in conflict with other sets of values.  But - in a pluralist world most would agree that the quest for principles must never become simply a sermon from a pulpit but should rather be based, at least in part, upon a pragmatic understanding and acceptance of differing value systems. This suggests a recognition of the important difference between where societies ‘are’ (descriptive ethics), and  where we might wish them ‘to be’ (normative ethics).

An example of a ‘universal’ ethical principle in disaster risk management (though clearly there have been many governments that have violated this notion) might be as follows:

“People have a basic right to safety and it is a fundamental obligation of all governments to ensure that their citizens are protected to a reasonable degree from known risks, and that citizens are informed and warned of any risks known to governmental officials that threaten public safety.”

Dunfee (2000) suggests several other principles that might be considered universal (or hypernorms):

• “To respect the equal dignity of all human beings, recognizing a basic right to life and subsistence.
• The condemnation of coarse public sector corruption
• The obligation to respect human autonomy.”

There are different kinds of objectivist moral theories (Boss, 2005), including utilitarianism/ consequentialism (maximizing some utility, such as happiness, by considering outcomes of actions – though the issue of what happiness is becomes a thorny one), ones that emphasize duties and rights (deontology), and ones that focus on being virtuous in character and intent. Different moral theories can result in very different disaster/disaster risk management strategies.  Consider disaster financial assistance as an example.  If one based this strategy on a utilitarian ethic emphasizing recovery to a pre-disaster state, then a program based upon this would reallocate societies resources to all victims, as needed.  However, one based upon the libertarian perspective on individual rights might take a very different approach and rely upon voluntary donations to charity to assist disaster victims.  This divergence is very much evident in the climate change debate, where some group (environmentalists and climatologists, for example) argue for mandatory reduction of greenhouse gas emissions while others (often funded by the petroleum industry) argues for voluntary reductions (Etkin, 2007).  Virtue ethics, duty ethics and consequentialism /utilitarianism are all important to disaster management.   Some people will always perform virtuous acts, particularly in responding to disasters; many people have duties to others, such as parents to children or first responders to victims; and the consequences of actions need to be considered, such as being efficient and efficacious in the allocation of resources.  Virtue ethics emphasizes right being over right action and is more about the overarching quality of goodness than a list of specific traits (such as courage, honesty etc). Aristotle and Confucius are examples of philosophers who believed in virtue ethics.

Examples of duties are: (W.D. Ross’s Seven Prima Facie Duties):

• Beneficence – the duty to do good and promote happiness
• Nonmaleficence – the duty to do no harm and to prevent harm
• Fidelity – duties arising from past commitments and promises
• Reparation – duties that stem from past harms
• Gratitude – duties based upon past favors and unearned services
• Self improvement – the duty to improve our knowledge and virtue
• Justice – the duty to give each person equal consideration

• Retributive justice – punishment for wrongdoing
• Distributive justice – fair distribution of benefits and burdens

Each type of moral theory has its strengths and weaknesses. Virtue ethics is criticized as being incomplete and not providing enough guidance for making real life decisions.  It does, however, give morality a personal face. Deontology places importance of duty and justice, and right actions, but fails to incorporate sentiment and care issues[4]. Utilitarianism challenges us to critically analyze traditional moral values and to consider outcomes, which can be critical.  But, by considering only consequences it ignores important issues such as integrity and responsibility, and goals other than an ‘arbitrarily’ chosen utility such as pleasure. Some philosophers argue that choices must be made between the different moral theories, but to the authors it seems reasonable that all three are relevant to disaster management and that a blended approach should be used.

Historically, moral theory focused primarily upon duties.  For example, feudal society was based upon reciprocity - sets of mutual obligations where duties were paramount – the vassal to the lord and the lord to his vassal.  The notion of ‘noblesse oblige’ is also based in duty, in that with power and privilege come responsibility (to those less fortunate).  Modern western society emphasizes rights to a much greater extent (for example, the constitution of the United States declares that people have inalienable rights).  The notion that rights and duties need to be linked is a strong one, in that rights are derived from duties (Boss, 2005).  The alternative comes from natural rights theory (such as expressed by John Locke), which says that having rights does not imply duties to others.[5]

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine different types of moral theories in detail and how they apply to disaster management (the reader is referred to Zack, 2006 or Dunfee, 2000 for more on this issue) – suffice it to say that a set of principles of disaster and disaster risk management must, of necessity, incorporate such notions or lack the roadmap needed to avoid going astray.  Having a clear vision of ethical principles that underlie a disaster management strategy will also enhance communication and coordination between different organizations.  An example of this is information sharing.  It is common for organizations to consider data that they have gathered confidential – yet not sharing information can make disaster recovery much more difficult, tedious and less effective.  The tradeoff here is a process that may benefit an institution as opposed to one that may benefit disaster victims.  Once the values of an organization have been clearly articulated, information sharing (the authors hope, reflecting a helping ethic that focuses on the importance of victims as compared to institutions) would be greatly enhanced. Other tradeoffs can be much less clear and far more tortuous.  For example, Wall (1998) in his book “Famine Crimes” discusses how the practice of humanitarianism in Africa, though often practiced with the most noble of intentions, nevertheless hindered the formation of the necessary social contract needed to truly create a society resilient to this type of disaster.

2. The complexity of current principles  

An internet search using the phrase “disaster management” resulted in 168 million hits; “principles of disaster management” resulted in 18 million hits.  Clearly, the words are much in use!  In order to get a sense for the variance of stated principles, the authors selected 15 sources in a rather arbitrary fashion, including various government and NGO web sites and books.  The stated principles varied greatly in number, perspective, and depth.  Some were comprised of a few short statements, sometimes embedded in much longer documents (for example, the Republic of South Africa Disaster Management Bill[6]), while others went into considerable depth and were multi-tiered (The Wingspread Principles: A Community Vision for Sustainability[7] and Gujarat State Disaster Management Policy[8]) Some statements emphasized values and ethics (South Asia: Livelihood Centered Approach to Disaster Management – a Policy Framework[9]) while others were more management oriented (Erik Auf Der Heide: Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination[10]).  These examples support the notion that the field of disaster management lacks a cohesive approach, in terms of principles. 

The three examples below (Table 1) illustrate some of these points. The first, taken from the Government of Canada is managerial in context, reflecting responsibilities at different levels of society.  There is nothing in this list that reflects normative values or ethics, or how disasters should be coped with in terms of types of actions.  The second, taken from the SPHERE Humanitarian Charter is very different, emphasizing how people should live and act, and the fundamental values that drive organizations.  The third example, taken from Auf der Heide (1989) are much more practically oriented, focusing on implementation strategies and error avoidance.

Table 1: Examples of Principles of Disaster Management from Three Sources:
(1) Fact Sheets: Canada's Emergency Management System[11]	Emergency management in Canada is based on the following principles: 1.             It is up to the individual to know what to do in an emergency. 2.             If the individual is unable to cope, governments respond progressively, as their capabilities and resources are needed. 3.             Most local emergencies are managed by local response organizations, which are normally the first to respond. 4.             Every province and territory also has an Emergency Management Organization (EMO), which manages any large scale emergencies (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) and provides assistance and support to municipal or community response teams as required. 5.             Government of Canada departments and agencies support the provincial or territorial EMOs as requested or manage emergencies affecting areas of federal jurisdiction. From policing, nuclear safety, national defence and border security to the protection of our environment and health, many federal departments and agencies also work to prevent emergencies from happening or are involved in some way in a response and recovery effort.
(2) Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response[12]	We reaffirm our belief in the humanitarian imperative and its primacy. By this we mean the belief that all possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to protection and assistance. It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in international humanitarian law and based on the principle of humanity, that we offer our services as humanitarian agencies. We will act in accordance with the principles of humanity and impartiality, and with the other principles set out in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994). 1.1   The right to life with dignity This right is reflected in the legal measures concerning the right to life, to an adequate standard of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. We understand an individual's right to life to entail the right to have steps taken to preserve life where it is threatened, and a corresponding duty on others to take such steps. Implicit in this is the duty not to withhold or frustrate the provision of life-saving assistance. In addition, international humanitarian law makes specific provision for assistance to civilian populations during conflict, obliging states and other parties to agree to the provision of humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civilian population lacks essential supplies. 1.2   The distinction between combatants and non-combatants This is the distinction which underpins the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977. This fundamental principle has been increasingly eroded, as reflected in the enormously increased proportion of civilian casualties during the second half of the twentieth century. That internal conflict is often referred to as ‘civil war’ must not blind us to the need to distinguish between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others (including the sick, wounded and prisoners) who play no direct part. Non-combatants are protected under international humanitarian law and are entitled to immunity from attack. 1.3 The principle of non-refoulement This is the principle that no refugee shall be sent (back) to a country in which his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or where there are substantial grounds for believing that s/he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
(3) Erik Auf Der Heide: Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination[13]	1.             Because of the limited resources available, disaster preparedness proposals need to take cost-effectiveness into consideration. 2.             Planning should be for disasters of moderate size (about 120 casualties); disasters of this size will present the typical inter-organizational coordination problems also applicable to larger events. 3.             Interest in disaster preparedness is proportional to the recency and magnitude of the last disaster. 4.             The best time to submit disaster preparedness programs for funding is, right after a disaster (even if it has occurred elsewhere). 5.             Disaster planning is an illusion unless: it is based on valid assumptions about human behavior, incorporates an inter-organizational perspective, is tied to resources, and is known and accepted by the participants. 6.             Base disaster plans on what people are "likely" to do, rather than what they "should" do 7.             For disaster planning to be effective, it must be inter-organizational. 8.             The process of planning is more important than the written document that results. 9.             Good disaster management is not merely an extension of good everyday emergency procedures. It is more than just the mobilization of additional personnel, facilities, and supplies. Disasters often pose unique problems rarely faced in daily emergencies. 10.          In contrast to most routine emergencies, disasters introduce the need for multi-organizational and multi-disciplinary coordination. 11.          In disasters, what are thought to be "communications problems" are often coordination problems in disguise. 12.          Those who work together well on a daily basis tend to work together well in disasters. 13.          Disasters create the need for coordination among fire departments, law enforcement agencies, hospitals, ambulances, military units, utility crews, and other organizations. This requires inter-agency communication networks utilizing compatible radio frequencies. 14.          Procedures for ongoing needs assessment are a prerequisite to efficient resource management in disasters. 15.          A basic concept of triage is to do the greatest good for the greatest number of casualties. 16.          Triage implies making the most efficient use of available resources. 17.          Good casualty distribution is particularly difficult to achieve in "diffuse" disasters, such as earthquakes and tornadoes, that cover large geographic areas. 18.          Effective triage requires coordination among medical and non-medical organizations at the disaster site and between the site and local hospitals 19.          Panic is not a common problem in disasters; getting people to evacuate is 20.          Inquires about loved ones thought to be in the impact zone are not likely to be discouraged, but can be reduced or channeled in less disruptive ways, if the needed information is provided at a location away from the disaster area. 21.          Many of the questions that will be asked by reporters are predictable, and procedures can be established in advance for collecting the desired information. 22.          Newsworthy information will rapidly spread among news organizations and from one type of media to another. 23.          The media will often withhold newsworthy disaster stories it feels would be detrimental to the public. 24.          Local officials will have to deal with different news media in times of disaster than those with which they interface on a routine basis. 25.          Adequate disaster preparedness requires planning with the rather than for the media. 26.          The propensity for the media to share information and to assume "command post" perspective facilitates the establishment of a central source of disaster information.

3. Introducing models                                                

In view of the somewhat chaotic state of existing principles, as noted above, the authors propose that the field of disaster/disaster risk management needs to engage in a discourse of its principles.  In order to provide some structure to the discussion, we present a model that we hope will clarify the discussion, and a process that could be used for a person or organization to develop an appropriate set of principles.

3.1 Principles Pyramid

We propose a four level hierarchy of principles (Figure 1) that can be used to provide structure to this issue. Level 1, the broadest, reflects the fundamental values and ethics that motivate our behaviors.  Level 2 is strategic and level 3 tactical.  Level 4 deals with implementation.  Levels 1 and 2 are broad enough so that they should be generally applicable over a large range of possibilities.  However, levels 3 and 4 become increasingly sensitive to local culture and legislation and are very difficult or impossible to generalize.

Level 1. Ethical, Core Value Principles, which relate to the underlying shared beliefs and concerns of organizations and of their mandate as it seeks to undertake community based disaster risk management (CBDRM). Using a food metaphor, Level 1 would relate the ethics of food production (such as a human rights based approach).  An example would be the SPHERE principle in Table 1 - “A right to a life with dignity”.

Level 2. Strategic Principles that concern the policy direction of CBDRM will be informed and be based upon the ethical principles articulated in Level 1 (such as what actions to consider taking-why, where and with what expected consequences?). Using a food metaphor, Level 2 would be a nutrition guide. An example of this level of principle would be the Canadian principle in Table 1 – “If the individual is unable to cope, governments respond progressively, as their capabilities and resources are needed.”

Level 3. Tactical Principles that concern the practical outworking of the strategic principles. Using a food metaphor, Level 3 would be a cookbook (such as how to adopt the agreed strategy, considering staffing / financial implications etc).    An example of this might be a specific mutual aid agreement between two organizations or the post audit of the response of an organization to a disaster, such as occurred with FEMA after Hurricane Katrina.

Level 4. Implementation Principles that are related to all the preceding levels: core values, strategies and tactics (such as actions taken as well as their monitoring and evaluation). Using a food metaphor, Level 4 would be eating the meal as well as congratulating the cook or writing a letter of complaint to the restaurant.  An example might the exchange of vulnerability and victim information between NGOs.

It is important to note that the authors do not consider this to be a linear unidirectional process, but rather one that necessitates continual feedback between ethical principles and how they are implemented.  It is not just that theory informs practice - it is also the reverse.  As a person or organization develops its strategies, it would have to revisit the more fundamental principles on an ongoing basis, and also consider how changes to values might affect higher levels of the pyramid.  It is not just about creating a “state function” but more about developing a “process” that incorporates ethics and values in an ongoing way.

Figure 1

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

3.2 Principles Matrix

The practice and theory of disaster management depends upon various factors, such as which pillar of disaster management is being considered (mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery), disaster type, capacity, scale and complexity.  Though underlying values are likely to be fairly robust, strategies, tactics and implementation increasingly depend upon these factors.   For example, the mitigation of drought might include multi levels of government working together to develop strategies to conserve water, develop crop insurance plans and incentives to switch to drought resistant crops, while responding to terrorism might emphasize a command and control first responders approach. At larger scales of mitigation (for natural hazards in particular), environmental stewardship and sustainable development would be important to include, though not for the case of response to smaller scale technological emergencies. The authors therefore suggest a matrix methodology, to help distinguish between these factors (Figure 2).

Figure 2

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

Figure 2 shows an example of how the pyramid discussed above might be slotted into the matrix model, in order to help focus the development of principles.  Similar figures could be constructed using different variables; disaster type is the most obvious one.  For example, disasters that are rapid onset, well defined and understood, of natural origin and of short time frame would require a very different set of coping strategies than one that was slow onset, diffuse, ill defined, poorly understood and of technological/human origin.

3.3 Constructing Principles

Constructing principles of disaster/disaster risk management is a complex task that should, if it is to be effective, involve an entire organization.   A useful process must allow for a discussion should begin at a very fundamental level, one that defines worldview and then moves increasingly towards a more detailed perspective. The authors suggest that a three step process be used as follows:

1. Step one begins with defining a Frame of Reference.  This refers to a person’s role as it relates to disaster management, their values, moral code and worldview.  Examples of roles could be: managing a government agency that provides disaster assistance, a business continuity manager for IBM, a victim without access to resources who cannot recover without help, or a Red Cross volunteer who responds to disasters.  Of course, people in different frames of reference might share the same values, but it is not uncommon for them to approach disasters from a very different set of needs and perspectives; hence, the sort of post disaster conflict that can arise between recovering victims and insurance companies[14].  In cases such as this, the values associated with disaster relief can conflict with other important institutional values, such as profitability.

2. The second step in the process is to define a Purpose of Disaster Management.  Depending upon philosophy, ethic and job, different purposes seem possible.  Three possible ones are listed below – more can certainly be constructed.

1. Minimize the loss, pain and damage caused by disasters, within the larger social context.
2. Minimize the damage caused by disasters, while maintaining the structures of rights, power and wealth within society, as well as the institutions that support them.
3. Provide jobs, careers and pensions to people who work in organizations related to disaster management, and ensure that these organizations are well funded[15].

This discussion should begin with explicit statements of the nature of the social contract and moral theories that are chosen. Clear distinctions need to be drawn between descriptive ethics (what is) and normative ethics (what ought to be). In cases where rights and duties conflict with each other, it is suggested that they be ranked where possible. 

3. The third step is to construct a Set of Principles, linked to the above, using the hierarchical structure and matrix models discussed above.

It is clear that different organizations will arrive at different results using the above process.  There is no “correct” answer – in fact engaging in the process[16] may well be more important than any specific set of results.

4. Applications 

The multi-layered hierarchy of principles described above in Model 1 was tested by Ian Davis by applying the concept within two projects that he has authored or co-authored.  The first, undertaken in 2005/06 for the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) was entitled: ‘Community- Based Disaster Risk Management.’ (Davis and Murshed, 2006). The second was ‘Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers’ published by the International Recovery Programme (IRP) in 2007 (Davis, 2007).

FIRST EXAMPLE:

‘Critical Guidelines - Community-Based Disaster Risk Management’

This document attempted to develop a set of principles and indicators relating to performance and outcomes to enable various groups involved in disaster risk reduction to measure progress.  In this document the four levels described in Figure 1 were adopted; the results were as follows:

LEVEL 1: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

1.1  Observe basic rights of beneficiaries (Ethical Issue: Respecting human dignity)[17]

• People possess basic rights that are to be observed, respected and followed when undertaking Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) These include rights to:
• safety,
• be listened to,
• be consulted over any issue that may affect their well-being or future,
• receive appropriate assistance following disaster impact.

1.2  Share risk  information  (Ethical Issue: Protecting lives)

• Any person or organization undertaking local risk assessment and discovering that a given community is ‘at-risk’, has an ethical responsibility to share this potentially life preserving information with the individuals, families and communities in question.

1.3  Share assessment data  (Ethical Issue: Respecting human dignity)

• Groups collecting post-disaster damage, needs and capacity assessments will share such information with other NGO’s or governments to avoid multiple questioning of affected communities and duplication in responding to needs. This principle grows from a concern to respect the dignity of beneficiaries of assistance.

1.4  Collaborate rather than compete (Ethical Issue: Integrity)

• Given a common overriding desire to serve the needs of the poor and vulnerable, there is an ethical demand for NGO’s undertaking CBDRM to agree to collaborate with other NGO’s and local governments, rather than compete with them. This concern is expressed by:
• avoiding competition to secure funds or projects,
• avoiding poaching staff from the local government or adjacent agencies
• using accurate images and data in publicity for fund-raising
• sharing information-(as noted above under 1.2 and 1.3)
• accepting government coordination of their work
• providing mutual support  to assisting bodies

LEVEL 2:  STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

2.1 Recognise strategic considerations (Strategic Issue: Integrity through Planning/Design)

• Before embarking on CBDRM a given NGO or government will build the following into project design:
• indicators to measure progress,
• a clear aim and the objectives to reach it,
• baseline data,
• ways to ensure transparency and accountability to beneficiaries,
• monitoring and evaluation procedures,
• an exit strategy.

2.2 Balance of trust vs. control (Strategic Issue: Expert judgment)

• In measuring the effectiveness of CBDRM it is vital to secure a fine balance between trust and control, since the greater the level of trust the smaller the need for controls.  Excessive controls in the form of performance and outcome indicators and a lack of involvement of key stakeholders in the formulation of indicators will significantly erode trust.

2.3 Ensure staff commitment and competence (Strategic Issue: Integrity through quality control)

• Agency and government officials who implement CBDRM projects and programmes need to be fully convinced that performance and outcome indicators are necessary and that they can significantly improve the efficiency and quality of risk reduction measures.  Training will be required to support this process.

LEVEL 3:  TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

3.1    Recognise tactical considerations   (Tactical Issue: Integrity though measuring  effectiveness)

• To be effective, performance and outcome indicators need to satisfy a range of demands.  Effective indicators are:
• transparent,
• robust,
• representative,
• relevant,
• replicable,
• nationally comparable,
• sustainable,
• measurable,
• achievable,
• time-framed,
• easily understood.

3.2    Establish baseline positions (Tactical Issue: Integrity through measuring effectiveness)

• For each performance indictor a baseline indicator is necessary.

3.3    Measure both quantifiable as well as non-quantifiable indicators

        (Tactical Issue: (Tactical Issue: Integrity through measuring effectiveness)

• Given the bias of performance indicators towards tangible, measurable and quantifiable elements it is essential to devise alternate ways to maintain and measure performance standards for non-quantifiable measures.

3.4    Establish minimum requirements  (Tactical Issue: Integrity through quality control)

• Minimum requirements are needed to make risk reduction effective to ensure that the competency of personnel, effectiveness of procedures, quality of measures does not fall below acceptable standards.

3.5    Ensure relevance of indicators (Tactical Issue: Integrity through quality control)

• Each performance indicator should define the conditions to which it applies since it is not expected that indicators will apply in all situations.

3.6    Mainstream actions into normal development (Tactical Issue: Integrity through quality control)

• Actions taken to implement Community Based Disaster Risk Management need to be integrated into normal development policies, planning, programming, and practice.

LEVEL 4:  IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES

4.1    Adapt indicators to suit local cultures  (Implementation Issue: Respecting human dignity)

• All performance indicators need to be considered to satisfy local social, cultural, economic and environmental variables.

4.2    Be aware of potential negative side effects (Ethical Issue: Integrity)

• In any project indicators are needed to indicate whether unexpected side effects are taking place, to enable swift evasive action to be taken.

COMMENTS ON THESE PRINCIPLES

Almost two years after writing the above principles, with the benefit of reflection, four issues emerge:

• It is much easier to develop principles that apply to the ethical or strategic level than at the tactical or implementation level. This is on account of the more general relevance of issues at ethical or strategic levels and the more specific relevance at tactical and implementation levels.
• In developing principles it is important to understand their underlying ethical intentions, as stated in italics after each principle. This is a positive process that provides an important emphasis on the underlying core values of disaster risk management. 
• Many of the ‘principles’ proposed for  tactical or implementation levels, can be better regarded  as ‘issues’ or ‘recommendations’.

• There are far too many principles for this specific task in managing community risks, since officials who have the task of applying them are unlikely to remember all fifteen and thus risk ignoring all of them.
• However, the process of systematic thought needed to develop this set of principles, within this hierarchy of categories, was of particular importance for us as the authors of this report, and of even more importance as we debated them with a workshop of experienced officials in Bangkok in January 2005. This is a reminder that a process of enquiry can be more important than a subsequent product.

The second document where principles were included is ‘Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers’ published by the International Recovery Programme (IRP) in 2007 (Davis, 2007).  In writing this book, which contains twelve themes each relating to disaster recovery, the initial intention was to apply the full hierarchy of principles to each theme, to conclude each chapter of the book. However, reviewers of the draft chapters commented that there was a ‘bewildering excess of principles’ and suggested that they be replaced by a single principle for each chapter.

SECOND EXAMPLE:

‘Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers’  

This report anticipates the later publication of the full book and includes just two of the chapters on the topics of ‘Reducing Risks in Disaster Recovery’ and ‘Organising Recovery’.  The principles selected for each chapter are as follows:

Guiding Principle: ‘Reducing Risks in Disaster Recovery’

‘Risk Reduction is a central aim of recovery management. Therefore, it is essential to use the recovery process to reduce future risks to avoid a repetition of the disaster. To achieve such protection it is necessary for officials to secure adequate budget and political support as well as the ‘buy-in’ of the intended beneficiaries of the undertaking.  When this support is assured, and only then, devise and implement an integrated risk reduction strategy’

Guiding Principle: ‘Organising Recovery’ 

‘Effective recovery requires a single point of overall responsibility in government. This may be best achieved by having a dedicated organization at the apex of political power and decision making. The organisation also needs:

·         a clear mandate supported by appropriate legislation

·         adequate financial, human and material resources

·         to be based on the ethical principles of accountability and transparency

·         direct links to all line ministries

·         knowledge of the dynamics of the disaster recovery process

·         mechanisms that permit continual two-way consultation with surviving communities

·         an effective Disaster Recovery Management Information System (DRMIS)’

Three Comments on these Principles:

First: It is not an easy process to capture the essence of a complex task and summarise it within a single guiding principle.

Second: The ‘Guiding Principles’ cited above could also be described as recommendations, or critical issues.

Third: These chapters containing the above principles were submitted to a senior technical editor, employed by one of the sponsoring UN agencies who commissioned this publication : ‘The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’ (ISDR)  In the final version of the paper, following heavy internal editing, both of the principles stated above were excluded.  However, the broad spirit of the sentiments that are implicit within them has been retained, but without the force of the designation ‘principle’.  This omission  may illustrate  a reluctance on the part of an official  international body such as the  United Nations to set out ‘principles’ lest these be regarded as controversial, attracting criticism or because they may have policy or financial implications.

5. Conclusions and where next?                                 

At the outset we stated that principles are essential to ‘guide actions’, ‘achieve something’, or define the ‘way to act’.  We hope that the discussion in this paper adds substance to this conviction.  The following concerns need to be noted and responded to.

Varied Perspectives

Devising a set of universal principles is not an easy task; in fact it may not even be possible, due to cultural relativism and varying frames of reference. A set of principles for an identical disaster recovery operation would tend to differ for survivors, the national government, the private sector and international relief agencies. Disasters occur within diverse cultural settings, so it is highly unlikely that specific ‘tactical’ or ‘implementation’ principles of disaster management that could relate to Canada would be relevant to Cambodia. 

Nevertheless, the diversity of standpoints can present a useful challenge in searching for a common approach, a shared understanding and common principles that effectively merges different interests. To do this will require (1) a disciplined thought process and (2) a dialogue to establish an ethical consensus from all standpoints. It is suggested that any principle for disaster recovery should start from the primary object of concern -namely the needs of the surviving population.  

There is an important distinction to be made between process and content.  There will be many difficulties, (if not impossibilities) in creating uniform sets of principles that are applicable to different cultures or organizations. But, the process of searching for principles are, in the authors opinion, essential.

The four stage hierarchy of principles introduced in this paper provides a useful template for programme and project managers. The process encourages an ethical basis for planning and decision making. However, we recognize the concern of officials, as noted in a cited example, to reduce principles to a manageable total. 

We believe that the process of creating principles seems likely to yield many significant benefits, by helping people and organizations to create policies that are consistent with their values, to explicitly consider how actions and values relate to each other, and by helping to create a shared understanding, not only within individual organizations but between them.  Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "The plan is useless; it's the planning that's important"; this same notion has applicability to the issue of disaster management and in the development of principles.

Maintaining Principles

While principles of disaster management exist, and in the case of the Red Cross ‘Code of Conduct ‘ have been widely endorsed, it is nevertheless clear that this is insufficient to ensure their compliance in the long term. Given the rapid turnover of agency staff and minimal induction training for new staff in most agencies, it would appear to be necessary for organizations to regularly re-launch ethics training.

International Dialogue

The time seems to be ripe for an international conference under UN auspices, (or Red Cross auspices) to specifically address this issue: “The quest for working Principles of Disaster Management”  This could usefully include  a discussion concerning the way principles are being followed in the Sphere Guidelines as well as in the Red Cross Code of Conduct  The conference and subsequent book could usefully  cover both Disaster Management (post-event) and Disaster Risk Management (pre-event).

7. References (to be completed)

ADB, OECD and Transparency International (2005).  Curbing Corruption in Tsunami

Relief Operations  Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADP) , Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Transparency International  

Alexander (1999).  in What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions

Alexander, D. (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management  Harpenden: Terra

Auf der Heide, Erik. (1989). Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination. http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/Images/Main.swf.

Alexander de Waal (1998). Famine Crimes; Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (African Issues), Indiana University Press.

Boss, J.A. (2005). Analyzing Moral Issues: Third Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill

Clinton, B. (2006).  Lessons for a Safer Future: Drawing on the experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster .  Eleven key actions for building nations’ and communities’ resilience to disasters.   New York and Geneva: ISDR

CRHNet (2005). The Principles for Disaster Management as a Key for Successful Management.  In: Reducing Risk Through Partnerships. Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Canadian Risk and Hazards Network (CRHNet) Symposium. Toronto, Canada, November 17-19, 2005.

Davis, I (2007). ‘Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers’   Geneva: International Recovery Programme (IRP)

Davis. I. and Murshed, Z (2006).  Community- Based Disaster Risk Management  Bangkok: Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC)

(this document can be ordered from ADPC by contacting Vicky Puzon-Diopenes at Vicky@adpc.net or it may be downloaded from www.adpc.net)

de Waal  A.(1998). Famine Crimes; Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (African Issues), PLACE?: Indiana University Press.

Drabek, T.E. (2005). Theories relevant to emergency management versus a theory of emergency management. Journal of Emergency Management, Vol 3(4), 49-4.

Dunfee, T.W. and Strudler, A. (2000). Moral Dimensions of Risk Transfer and Reduction Strategies.  In Disaster Risk Management Series no. 2: Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies, Washington D.C:  World Bank, Kreimer A. and Arnold M. editors,  pp. 109-120.

Erik Auf der Heide, Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination [book on-line]; available from http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/static.htm.

Etkin, D. and Ho, E. (2007). Climate Change: Perceptions and Discourses of Risk.  Journal of Risk Research (in press).

Good Humanitarian Donorship (2003).  ‘Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian

Donorship’ 17  June   http://www.reliefweb.int/ ghd/a%2023%20Principles %20EN- GHD19.10.04%20 RED.doc  

Jigyasu, R. (2005). “Disaster: A Reality or Construct? Perspective From the East”, in What is a Disaster?

Scheper, E et al ( 2006).  Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities.

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, (cited  p.21) of  Telford,J and Cosgrave, J (2007) The

international humanitarian system and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis

Disasters  Vol. 31 No.1 March 2007 

Telford,J and Cosgrave, J (2007). The international humanitarian system and the 2004

Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis   Disasters  Vol. 31 No.1 March 2007  pp 1-28

Zack, N. (2006). Philosophy and Disasters. Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 2(1)

Figure 1

Figure 2

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[1] In recent years these terms have been widely accepted. ‘Disaster Management’ refers to the post-disaster management of emergencies while ‘Disaster Risk Management’ describes the pro-active processes of risk assessment and risk reduction.  Another term, ‘Disaster Recovery Management’ referring to longer-term disaster recovery, is gradually being added to these descriptions as recovery secures belated recognition amongst policy makers and funding institutions.

[2] Ian Davis was on the management board of an international relief agency during the 1970’s and witnessed the forces of self-interest in action. He recalls some alarming boardroom discussions where the agency financial director would express the ‘need’ for a major disaster to occur within a given financial year to produce the consequent influx of funds from agency supporters to ensure that staff redundancies would not occur.  This was on account of a 14 -20% allocation of administrative and handling charges that the agency deducted from every contribution and disasters provided the major ‘financial surges’ needed to fill the agencies administrative budget. Therefore, we were faced as board members with the blunt reality that if there were few disasters in a given year the agency had to loose staff and cut back on essential administrative requirements.  However, some ‘creative accounting’ mechanisms were introduced by certain agencies to offset this risk by dubiously charging the salaries of home or overseas based aid administration staff as a project or donation item, as a way to boost the administration ‘top-slice’. Needless to say, loyal constituency supporters of agencies were never informed about such subtleties as the agency ‘adjusted’, (or manipulated)  their supporters contributions to meet the agency’s internal requirements

[3] For example, law 229 of the Code of Hammurabi from 1760 B.C. states that “If a builder build a house for some one, and does not construct it properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that builder shall be put to death.”

[4] The importance of care and sentiment has been given greater focus as a result of the incorporation of feminism into moral theory.

[5] An example of this is whether or not providing disaster assistance to people is linked to their taking reasonable precautions to mitigate their risk.  For example, if somebody knowingly builds in a flood zone when they have alternative options, do they have a right to compensation in the event of a disastrous flood.

[6] http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/bills/2001/b58-01.pdf

[7] http://www.smartcommunities.ncat.org/wingspread2/wingprin.shtml

[8] http://www.gujaratindia.com/Policies/Policy2.pdf

[9] http://www.itdg.org/?id=disasters_livelihood_approach

[10] http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/disasterresponse.nsf/section?openview

[11] http://www.ocipep.gc.ca/info_pro/fact_sheets/general/EM_can_emerg_man_sys_e.asp 

[12] http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/index.htm 

[13] http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/disasterresponse.nsf/section?openview

[14] For example, after the Hurricane Katrina disaster victims launched a class action suit against State Farm Insurance and American International Group regarding denial of claims or lack of response.

[15] Our thanks to Dennis Mileti for this suggestion.

[16] This perspective was put forth by Dwight D. Eisenhower who said, "The plan is useless; it's the planning that's important."

[17]  The issues stated after each principle, (as set in italics), have been added to the original text